W e examine variation in intraprofessional status changes for employees displaced by organizational failure. We propose that failure-related reductions in bargaining power are moderated by individual status characteristics that influence potential employers' evaluations of job candidates and, therefore, individuals' status loss risks. Treating a prominent law firm's failure as a quasi-experiment, we test our arguments by analyzing 224 firm partners' transitions to subsequent employers. Most partners regained employment at firms of lower status than the failed firm. But, independent of their demonstrated productivity, a partner's likelihood of status loss increased with tenure in the failed firm's partnership and decreased with educational prestige. These results suggest not only that organizational failure can diminish cumulative career advantages but also that status characteristics that enable attainment, such as education, can protect individuals against status loss.
Introduction
Many professionals' rewards are governed by statusbased processes (Cole and Cole 1973 , Broughton and Mills 1980 , Allison et al. 1982 , Smith and Abbott 1983 , Bielby and Bielby 1996 , Zuckerman 1998 , FernandezMateo 2009 ). In particular, early demonstrations of ability enable some individuals to accumulate career advantages over their peers (Merton 1968 (Merton , 1988 Gould 2002) . Prior research naturally examines the mechanisms that enhance career advantages and form the basis of such status processes.
Although scholars voice continuing interest in understanding the conditions that can diminish accumulated career advantages, empirical research on this topic is notably lacking (Merton 1968 , Cole and Singer 1991 , Zuckerman 1998 , DiPrete and Eirich 2006 , Bidwell et al. 2013 .
In this study, we therefore consider factors that can reduce accumulated career advantages. In particular, we examine organizational failure as an event that can trigger intraprofessional status loss. Prior research implies that intraprofessional status may be lost after one's employer fails because other organizations will hesitate to implicitly associate with a failed organization by hiring its former employees (Sørensen 1999 , Jensen 2006 . Other research suggests that the careers of some individuals might be more resistant to the adverse consequences of organizational failure (Sutton and Callahan 1987, D'Aveni 1990) . The possibility of variation in consequences implies that some individuals' accumulated career advantages may be diminished by failure while others' advantages are maintained. In this study, we consider how failure might diminish one's professional status and which employees are affected most adversely.
We focus our attention on the market interface between individuals and employers. Employees displaced into the labor market by organizational failure seek new jobs and prospective employers evaluate their candidacies. We argue that shared beliefs about individual characteristics influence the extent to which failure diminishes individual labor market bargaining power (Phillips 2001) . First, failure eliminates one's current job and, therefore, one's next-best alternative to negotiating employment with another organization (Haveman and Cohen 1994, Phillips 2001) . Second, organizational failure can worsen one's job opportunities because hiring associates one's prior and current employers, and organizations generally avoid affiliating with failed organizations (Baty et al. 1971 , Sørensen 1999 , Jensen 2006 . These two mechanisms can increase any displaced employee's risk of losing intraprofessional status, but we further propose that the severity of bargaining power reductions varies by individual.
Expectation states and status construction theories suggest that hiring organizations evaluate job candidates by reconciling aggregate beliefs about both negative and positive characteristics (Berger and Webster 2006 , Gorman 2006 , Ridgeway et al. 2009 ). Negative status characteristics worsen such evaluations whereas positive status characteristics enhance them, and consequently, bargaining power reductions vary across individuals. Therefore, we propose that two status characteristics influence postfailure labor market outcomes: individuals' prior employment and education affiliations.
Organization Science 26(3), pp. 633-649, © 2015 INFORMS First, we treat association with failure as an individual-specific status characteristic that activates jobspecific expectations of future performance. Although association with failure will cast doubts on all displaced employees' abilities to succeed in a similar role (Sutton and Callahan 1987) , those most strongly associated with the failed organization are likely to bear the brunt of failure-related discredit. If such associations are increasing with employment duration, then the longer an individual's tenure at the failed organization, the more severely his or her bargaining power is reduced by failure and the more likely he or she is to lose intraprofessional status.
Second, we treat educational prestige as a diffuse status characteristic that is based on group affiliation and activates general expectations of future job performance and ability (Moore 1968, Berger and Webster 2006) . If widespread beliefs about the relationship between human capital and educational prestige favor members of advantaged categories such as graduates of prestigious schools (Ridgeway et al. 2009 , Sauer et al. 2010 , then educational prestige can buffer displaced employees against bargaining power reductions. The likelihood of intraprofessional status loss should, therefore, be decreasing with one's educational prestige. This argument is, of course, conditional on accounting for the extent to which prestige signals individual ability (e.g., Spence 1973) .
We test our claims by studying the failure of a large, prominent law firm and variation in the postfailure labor market outcomes of its senior lawyers. This approach holds constant the reason for the interorganizational transition, economic conditions at the time of transition, and the institutions governing the labor market. Prior to its sudden and unexpected failure, the firm was one of the most highly regarded law firms in the United States. Industry observers were shocked and partners embarrassed when the firm dissolved surprisingly in February 2003 because of financial mismanagement (Glater 2003) .
Our analyses reveal that most of the firm's partners regained employment at employers of lower intraprofessional status than the failed firm. But labor market outcomes varied with the strength of the partners' association with the failed firm and with the prestige of their degree-granting law school. Independent of exit timing, productivity, geographic location, legal practice area, or other relevant factors, the longer a lawyer was a member of the failed firm's partnership, the more likely he or she was to regain employment at a lowerstatus employer. Additionally, graduates of the most prestigious law schools were least likely to experience such a status loss. We infer that organizational failure reduced bargaining power and, on average, resulted in intraprofessional status loss. But specific and diffuse status characteristics moderated bargaining power reductions and, consequently, produced variation in postfailure outcomes. The results suggest that although failure diminishes intraprofessional status on average, individual characteristics that enable attainment (e.g., education) also buffer one against status losses.
Theoretical Development: Failure, Bargaining Power, and Intraprofessional Status Loss
Our inquiry is naturally situated in the organizational literature on labor markets, which conceives of markets as interfaces in which individuals take the role of job candidates and employers take the role of candidate evaluators (Phillips and Zuckerman 2001) .
In general, the hiring opportunities available to candidates and employing organizations depend on their relative bargaining power in the labor market. Two factors influence the bargaining power of an employing organization and an individual job candidate: (1) the organization's dependence on an individual for labor and (2) the individual's dependence on the organization for employment. An individual's chances of attaining a high-status position increase with the value that potential employers place on his or her labor and with the value of his or her current position (Blau and Duncan 1967 , Phillips 2001 , Beckman and Phillips 2005 . Phillips (2001) explicitly links individual attainment to the relative bargaining power of organizations and individuals. He proposes that the stronger an organization's relative bargaining position, the less likely the employer is to offer a high-status position to an individual. His study of law firm personnel finds that promotion rates are highest in firms that are most likely to fail; a study of television station managers yields similar insights (Phillips and Sørensen 2003) . These studies suggest that the more favorable an organization's life chances, the greater the organization's labor market bargaining power. Originally developed within the context of an ongoing employment relationship, we extend Phillips' logic to potential employment relationships between organizations and individual candidates to understand heterogeneous effects of failure on displaced employees.
In employment negotiations between organization and individual, relative bargaining power depends on the respective life chances of the individual's current and potential employers. When organizations fail, displaced employees must seek employment in surviving organizations (Sutton and Callahan 1987) , exit the labor market (Haveman and Cohen 1994) , or transition to self-employment (Sørensen 2007) . Relative to the prefailure time period, prospective employers will be less inclined to offer a high-status job to individuals postfailure because elimination of the individual's previously Downloaded from informs.org by [170.140.26 .180] on 29 May 2015, at 07:10 . For personal use only, all rights reserved. Rider and Negro: Organizational Failure and Intraprofessional Status Loss Organization Science 26(3), pp. 633-649, © 2015 INFORMS 635 best employment alternative weakens the individual's bargaining power (Phillips and Sørensen 2003) .
Organizational failure can reduce the bargaining power of displaced employees and decrease their chances of maintaining intraprofessional status. We therefore expect that individuals displaced by organizational failure will typically regain employment at organizations of lesser status than the failed employer, what we term intraprofessional status loss.
1 Our next objective is to account for individual variation in observed status changes. Our argument implies that the factors related to such variation-association with failure and educational prestige-influence labor market evaluations even after accounting for direct indicators of workplace productivity.
Applying Status Characteristics Theory
Organizations generally refrain from associating with negative events such as failure (Jensen 2006) . Because hiring implicitly associates one's current and former employers, hiring former employees of failed organizations can damage the hiring organization's reputation (Sørensen 1999 , Burton et al. 2002 , Roberts and Khaire 2009 , and even discredit-by-affiliation can diminish one's bargaining power (e.g., Pontikes et al. 2010 ). But we presume that displaced employees will vary along many dimensions that likely influence postfailure assessments of job candidates and, consequently, moderate reductions in bargaining power. Therefore, we relax the individual-equivalence assumption and focus on two status characteristics that vary across individuals.
Status characteristics define attributes that influence beliefs about underlying social differences. When observed, status characteristics are considered valid social distinctions that shape expectations about future behaviors and task performance (Ridgeway 1991 , Berger et al. 1998 , Sauer et al. 2010 . Moreover, status beliefs developed in one context are often applied in other contexts (Ridgeway 1991) .
Researchers distinguish between diffuse and specific status characteristics. Diffuse status characteristics are readily observed attributes of categorical groups (e.g., gender, race) that imply relative competency in a wide variety of domains, thereby activating both general and specific expectations of performance. Specific status characteristics are individual attributes (e.g., motivation) that implicate competency within a clearly defined domain, thereby activating task-relevant expectations of performance. For example, pervasive cultural stereotypes might lead an evaluator to expect a female lawyer to outperform a male nonlawyer in tests of persuading a child to behave properly (as a result of the diffuse female characteristic) as well as the task of persuading a jury to convict an accused felon (as a result of the specific lawyer characteristic). Specific characteristics are often less easily observed than diffuse ones.
Expectation states theory maintains that social agents attend to status characteristics in evaluating individuals in task groups and other settings, combining beliefs about negative and positive status characteristics to form aggregate evaluations (Berger et al. 1977 (Berger et al. , 1980 Humphreys and Berger 1981) . Organizational hiring decisions, therefore, necessitate processing both positive (e.g., prior accomplishments) and negative (e.g., prior failures) information about a potential employee in order to assess his or her candidacy (Gorman 2006 , Sauer et al. 2010 . In this way, status characteristics shape evaluators' expectations of displaced employees' future job performance should the individual be hired.
Association with Failure and Risk of Status Loss
In sociological models of labor markets, a job candidate's perceived suitability for a position is based not only on the candidate's track record of performance but also on the identities of people and organizations who trained him or her (Zuckerman et al. 2003) . Association with failed organizations is a negative status characteristic because such associations often cause others to doubt an individual's character and competence (Goffman 1963, Sutton and Callahan 1987) . We consider association with failure to be a specific status characteristic that informs evaluators about an individual's competencies. Association with failure is gauged by matching a candidate's prior employment spells with employer performance and estimating the candidate's culpability for the failure. We think that association with failure diminishes potential employers' specific expectations of one's future performance in a similar role. If prior failures reduce expectations of future job performance, then valuations of an individual's labor will be negatively related to the strength of one's association with failure.
Some displaced employees will be more strongly associated with organizational failure than others. In particular, we consider the strength of association with failure to vary with employment duration because, over time, an employee's professional identity becomes congruent with the identity of her or his employer (O'Reilly and Chatman 1986 , Chatman 1991 , Sluss and Ashforth 2008 . Consequently, association with failure increase with the length of one's employment duration with the failed organization. Our first hypothesis is, therefore, based on the expectation that bargaining power is reduced in proportion to the duration of one's employment at the failed organization.
Hypothesis 1 (H1). The greater one's association with a failed employer, the higher the likelihood that he or she regains employment at an organization of lesser status than the failed employer. 
Educational Prestige and Risk of Status Loss
The discussion above suggests that association with organizational failure imposes a negative status characteristic on an individual's job candidacy. But such negative associations can be counterbalanced by positive status characteristics (Gorman 2006) . We consider one that is critical in the professional sector, educational prestige. Educational prestige represents a status characteristic based on group affiliation that informs evaluators' expectations of one's ability and performance at a wide variety of tasks Webster 2006, Sauer et al. 2010) . Educational background is an easily observable, diffuse status characteristic that economists also consider to be a credible signal of general ability (e.g., Spence 1973) .
Many employers view ability as increasing with the prestige of higher education institutions-even when evidence is contrary to this belief (D'Aveni 1990, Hitt et al. 2001) . For example, Rivera (2011) finds that educational credentials are the most commonly applied criteria in résumé screening and that, furthermore, employers attribute superior ability to graduates of the most prestigious schools independent of academic achievement. If educational prestige generally activates expectations of high job performance, then differences in candidates' educational backgrounds can become especially pronounced postfailure.
If widespread beliefs about educational prestige and ability favor graduates of prestigious schools in hiring decisions (Ridgeway et al. 2009 , Sauer et al. 2010 , Rivera 2011 , then educational prestige can protect one from failure-related discredit. Although organizational failure exposes all employees to bargaining power reductions, our second hypothesis is motivated by the expectation that the magnitude of such reductions will decrease with educational prestige.
Hypothesis 2 (H2). The greater one's educational prestige, the lesser the likelihood that he or she regains employment at an organization of lesser status than the failed employer.
In summary, we argue that organizational failure will reduce displaced employees' labor market bargaining power and, furthermore, that associations with failure and educational prestige moderate the magnitude of such reductions. We mentioned above that association with failure and educational prestige ought to influence labor market evaluations even after accounting for observable workplace productivity. Our analyses, therefore, account for the availability of such direct information in estimating the effects of status characteristics on postfailure labor market outcomes.
Human capital arguments suggest that employers value educational prestige because it signals ability when clearer indicators are difficult or costly to observe, which is more typical of inexperienced job candidates (e.g., Spence 1973) . If employers can easily and cheaply observe the quality of a job candidate, then it is not clear that educational prestige should retain its signal value. Similarly, other research suggests that those most likely to be adversely affected by associations with failure will strategically time their organizational departure to minimize such associations (Semadeni et al. 2008 ). This would suggest that the employees who are displaced at failure ought not to experience variation in status loss (or gain). Therefore, we test our arguments in a context where individual productivity and strategic avoidance can be observed for a large group of experienced professionals. Consequently, the null hypotheses seem compelling. The firm was widely regarded as one of the premier law firms for technology companies, employing more than 900 lawyers and more than 200 partners in 14 cities worldwide at its peak. In 2000, Brobeck generated $476 million in revenue and $1.2 million in profits per partner, and in 2002, the firm was ranked as the 26th most prestigious firm in the United States, according to the Vault Guide to the Top 100 Law Firms (Moshan 2002 ; hereafter referred to as "the Vault 100"). Brobeck's collapse was surprising to many legal professionals. Although law firm dissolutions are not uncommon (Phillips 2001 (Phillips , 2002 Heinz 2009 ), firms as large as Brobeck rarely dissolve; mergers are a more typical end.
As the technology boom turned to bust in 2001 and 2002, Brobeck's revenues declined and the firm's debts loomed larger. Brobeck's partnership secured a $40 million loan from Citibank so that, even as the firm declined in 2002, partners received capital distributions in anticipation of their annual bonuses (Glater 2003) . Such practices are common in large law firms, but given Brobeck's financial position, this was viewed by industry observers as misguided if not fraudulent. Many doubted that Brobeck could service its debt obligations and meet partners' bonus expectations. Matters were further complicated by the departures of partners who left for jobs at competitors, including the firm's chairman, who left in the middle of 2002 for a rival firm. Such extractions of human capital increase firm failure risks (Phillips 2002 ). Brobeck's demise was accelerated by decreasing revenues, increasing debt, and defections.
In 2002, Brobeck negotiated with Citibank on the terms of a $90 million outstanding debt. Saddled with expensive office leases, Brobeck cut costs by laying off or offering severance packages to employees, halting employee reimbursements for firm expenses, and, unbeknownst to many employees, neglecting to pay administrative fees for a $160 million 401(k) plan (Glater 2003 Some industry observers attributed the failure to financial mismanagement (Heinz 2009 ); others highlighted partner greed. For example, the trustee for the Brobeck estate claimed that former partners steered the firm into a "death spiral" by "taking for themselves and spending on leasehold improvements more than $100 million in excess of Brobeck's net income for 2001 and 2002" (Young 2005) . So negative was the fallout that the New York Times reported that many partners "were embarrassed by the collapse of the firm and no longer wanted to have their names associated with it" (Glater 2003) .
Approximately 72% of Brobeck partners remained until the firm's official end. It should not be taken for granted, though, that the former partners would experience negative career consequences, postfailure. Many maintained impressive client rosters and generated substantial profits. An industry consultant remarked that "Brobeck was a great firm, and it was full of talented, bright, highly motivated people" (Schmitt 2005) . Another suggested that although Morgan, Lewis & Bockius did not merge with Brobeck, that firm would be "interested in picking up whatever good partners they can" (Sandburg 2003) . Competitors that hired former Brobeck partners might gain an advantage over competitors. Brobeck's corporate clients needed to take their legal services business somewhere, so firms could have added technology clients by hiring ex-Brobeck partners.
Interestingly, rival firms experienced negative labor market feedback based on their similarity and proximity to Brobeck (e.g., Jonsson et al. 2009 ). Law school students asked in job interviews, "How do I know you're not another Brobeck?" (Young 2003) . The bankruptcy proceedings would attract negative attention for firms that hired former Brobeck partners involved in the proceedings. Furthermore, the Brobeck estate threatened to sue partners' subsequent employers for causing the firm's dissolution and bankruptcy. This set of postfailure circumstances severely reduced Brobeck partners' job prospects. Obviously, continued employment at Brobeck was no longer an option. As one industry consultant put it, "It's not like they were recruited away as lateral partners-these people changed jobs because they had to" (Schmitt 2005) . Partners who left months prior to dissolution found their job prospects weakened by widespread industry rumors of Brobeck's finances.
Faced with clients preparing to take their business to rivals, partners quickly negotiated employment for themselves and their teams. Their power to do so was reduced by the fact that prospective employers were well aware of these pressures. One partner stated, "The lights were going to go out. We only had two weeks to make a move," and another offered a vivid analogy: "I think there's a lifeboat mentality to jump in the first nice lifeboat " (Schmitt 2005) . Not all prospective employers would tolerate the negative feedback in service and labor markets that hiring former Brobeck partners would likely invite. Brobeck's failure sufficiently weakened former partners' bargaining power.
Analysis
We analyze the postdissolution employment transitions of former partners employed in all of Brobeck's U.S. offices. We identified partners and their career histories as follows. First, attorneys employed by Brobeck as of November 2002 and January 2003 were obtained from archived copies of Brobeck's website from the Internet Archive (https://archive.org). This criterion effectively samples partners who departed prefailure. Second, creditors sued all former partners, so bankruptcy filings made publicly available by a former Brobeck administrator enabled us to identify more partners (Brobeck Info 2009 ). Third, legal publications were searched to identify partner transitions from Brobeck to other firms in 2002 and 2003. We excluded 16 former partners employed in Brobeck's European offices, 3 retired partners, and 9 partners whose whereabouts could not be determined. We test our hypotheses with this sample of 224 former partners-63 who left before and 161 who left after the failure-subsequently hired by 69 organizations after their employment spell at Brobeck ended.
We treat Brobeck's failure as a quasi-experiment in which we do not administer the experimental condition (i.e., failure) but are able to characterize heterogeneity in individual responses (i.e., status loss) to the condition. We employ a "one-group pretest-posttest design" in which we observe a group of individuals employed by the same firm both before and after failure (Cook and Campbell 1979) . A within-lawyer counterfactual clarifies our key identifying assumption that Brobeck partners would have remained in their positions and therefore maintained their intraprofessional status had Brobeck survived. According to Incisive Legal Intelligence's Lateral Partner moves database, which summarizes hiring information from the American Lawyer's annual Lateral Partner Survey of Am Law 200 firms, industry publications, firm websites, and press releases, in 2003 there were approximately 35,000 partners employed by the top 200 highest-grossing U.S. law firms and approximately 1,130 lateral movements of partners out of those firms-a baseline turnover rate of approximately 3.5%. Although our data do not enable a formal test of a "status loss following failure" hypothesis, these comparisons suggest that postdissolution changes in intraprofessional status are largely due to the firm's failure. (and most likely reduced compensation, too). Descriptive statistics corroborate this interpretation. As Figure 1 illustrates, 183 of the 224 Brobeck partners (82%) in our sample regained employment at firms of lower status than Brobeck. Because Brobeck was ranked 26th in the 2002 Vault 100, we consider any employer ranked 27th or worse or unranked as "status loss" and any firm ranked 25th or better as "status gain." To put this outcome variation into perspective, whereas Vault ranked Brobeck 26th in 2002, the median former Brobeck partner regained employment at the firm Vault ranked 48th in 2003. Figure 2 illustrates the associated reduction in average firm profitability; less prestigious firms also produce, on average, lower profitability than more prestigious competitors.
Measures
To characterize individual-level variance in outcomes, we recorded the status of partners' first post-Brobeck employers in order. Our employer status measure is In unreported analyses, we estimated multinomial logit models based on categorical status rankings of law firms as a dependent variable (i.e., 1 to 25, 26 to 50, and 50 to unranked) and found similar results. We prefer the more straightforward interpretation of the logit models. The key independent variables in this individual-level, status mobility analysis are the number of years that each lawyer was a member of the Brobeck partnership and the prestige of the law school attended by each partner. We test Hypothesis 1 by counting the number of years that a lawyer was a Brobeck partner as of 2003. This variable measures the strength of each partner's association with failure, accounting for the extent to which a partner's labor market identity is intertwined with Brobeck.
To test Hypothesis 2, we constructed two measures of educational prestige: one continuous and one categorical. We identified the law school attended by each lawyer using website biographies obtained from either the Brobeck website or the hiring firm website. Ranks for each of these 61 law schools were obtained from the 2003 U.S. News and World Report "Best Law School" list (U.S. News and World Report 2003; hereafter referred to as "U.S. News") rankings (Espeland and Sauder 2007 , Sauder 2008 , Sauder and Espeland 2009 . In 2003, the U.S. News rankings included 196 law schools and ranked 113 of those schools betweenFor our continuous measure of educational prestige, we assigned actual U.S. News ranks for schools ranked between 1 and 100 and a rank of 152 to all Tier Two and unranked law schools.
2 Educational prestige is reverse coded so that more prestigious schools are assigned lower numeric ranks. We also followed Phillips and Zuckerman (2001) and coded a binary indicator elite law school graduate variable that equals 1 if the lawyer graduated from Berkeley, Columbia, Chicago, Georgetown, Harvard, Michigan, New York University, Stanford, Virginia, or Yale law schools; otherwise, it equals 0.
Control Variables
We measured additional control variables using data in Brobeck's bankruptcy filings. The first is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the partner was hired laterally into the Brobeck partnership (i.e., hired from another firm as a partner) and equal to 0 if the partner was promoted from within the firm (i.e., associate to partner). Another is an indicator variable that equals 1 for female lawyers and 0 for male lawyers. Additionally, we fit our initial models by including an any California office indicator variable that equals 1 for Brobeck partners based in the Irvine, Los Angeles, Palo Alto, San Diego, and San Francisco offices and equals 0 otherwise. We also include a variable that equals 1 for Brobeck partners that worked in the firm's "business and technology" practice and equals 0 otherwise. In some specifications, we deploy a more extensive scheme to account for more fine-grained office and practice area differences.
To account for individual partner productivity differences attributable to differences in human and social capital, we obtained internal compensation documents made publicly available by a former Brobeck administrator (Brobeck Info 2009). Lawyers are typically compensated for projects originated for the firm and for billable hours. Because Brobeck partners were all equity partners, operating income appropriately measures productivity; all partners were compensated according to the same criteria. The top 90% of the income distribution of our sample (excluding primarily part-time and recently elected partners) were paid between $300,000 and $1.4 million in 2001. But these figures increase with a partner's level in the Brobeck partnership, which produces a strong positive correlation between the two variables.
The Brobeck partnership consisted of 11 equity levels. We included each partner's numeric level in the specification; higher numbers indicate more senior members of the partnership. Additionally, this variable accounts for partners' equity interests in the Brobeck partnership, which is positively correlated with partnership tenure but might influence both departure timing and postfailure labor market outcomes for reasons other than those theorized (e.g., liquidity constraints). We interpret coefficients on this variable to be indicative of a partner's consideration of many potential employers; the higher his or her level, the more firms in which a partner can probably afford to purchase an equity interest. Note that this interpretation is made possible by simultaneously controlling for partnership tenure and productivity.
To reduce multicollinearity, we also regressed operating income on partnership level and retained each Brobeck partner's residual operating income (in thousands of U.S. dollars) in 2001. Of two partners at equal levels, the one with the higher income residual can be considered the more productive partner. This variable also accounts for human or social capital differences that educational prestige might otherwise signal; income residuals should be positively correlated with lawyer ability.
In some specifications, we add indicator variables for office location and practice area to account for geographic and practice-specific variance in partners' postBrobeck labor market opportunities. For example, there are more potential legal employers in New York City than in Denver, and some areas of the law (e.g., securities, intellectual property) are accorded greater intraprofessional status than other areas (Sandefur 2001) . We account for the primary office location for each former Brobeck partner based on his or her Brobeck website biography by including binary indicator variables for Brobeck's Los Angeles, New York City, Palo Alto, San Diego, San Francisco, Austin or Dallas, and the Washington, DC metro area (Washington, DC or Reston, Virginia); the omitted category includes Brobeck lawyers in the Irvine, California, and Denver, Colorado offices. 3 We also include indicator variables for the following areas of law practiced by each partner to account for practice-specific differences in labor market opportunities: business and technology; commerce and finance; complex, consumer, and commercial litigation (litigation practice); intellectual property; and securities litigation. Approximately 83% of the 224 lawyers in our sample were members of these practice areas. The omitted category includes antitrust, insurance, labor and employment, life sciences, product liability, real estate, and tax practices. Table 1 presents summary statistics and correlations for variables included in the analyses.
Accounting for Departure Timing
The timing of departure from Brobeck varied across partners; see Figure 3 . Less than 30% of Brobeck partners (i.e., 63 individuals) left the firm before its dissolution. The vast majority, 161 individuals, transitioned after the firm's failure in February 2003. The median partner who remained with Brobeck until its dissolution regained employment at a firm with a 2003 Vault 100 prestige score of 5.3 (Brobeck's 2002 score was 7.3), but the median partner who left Brobeck in the months preceding the firm's dissolution regained employment at a firm with a prestige score of 6.5. Although consistent with our bargaining power argument and prior findings (e.g., Semadeni et al. 2008 ), departure timing is not exogenously determined. Below, we explain our two approaches to account for this. The first approach involves using sampling weights. Testing Hypothesis 1 necessitates some statistical adjustments to account for the fact that partners more strongly associated with Brobeck (i.e., longer tenure) were less likely to depart the firm prior to failure and, therefore, more likely to have their bargaining power reduced. Although the timing of departure is not exogenous to failure, we can account for departure timing conditional on observed covariates so that estimates of our key effects are net of the determinants of a prefailure departure.
The relationship between one's tenure as a Brobeck partner and departure timing is the central endogeneity concern in our analysis. There are at least two mechanisms that could produce differences in the labor market outcomes of employees in prefailure and postfailure departure groups. One mechanism is reduced bargaining power as a result of association with failure, and a second mechanism is adverse selection into association with failure. As we argue, bargaining power should be reduced by failure. But those with the best labor market opportunities are also more likely to depart prefailure. If we did not account for selection into departure timing, we might falsely infer that those who departed postfailure were more likely to experience status loss as a result of reductions in bargaining power instead of selection into timing (i.e., those most likely to preserve status disproportionately departed prefailure). So a comparison of partners who secured new jobs prior to Brobeck's failure and partners who remained with Brobeck until after its failure is compromised by endogenous departure timing.
Given the need to include many indicator variables in the specification (e.g., lateral hire, female, office, practice), we would like to retain as many observations as possible. But we also want to account for the fact that some observations are probably "more typical" than others. We therefore weight observations by the inverse probability of departing Brobeck prior to failure, conditional on observed covariates. This inverse probability figure is greatest for those partners least likely to have departed Brobeck prior to failure. This approach enables us to retain partners who departed prior to Brobeck's failure so that we have enough observations in each office and practice area to include these fixed effects in our specification. But greater emphasis is placed on the postfailure departure group of partnersthe more typical subsample-within the full sample. Although we do not consider departure timing to be a treatment variable in our analysis, inverse probability weighting modifies our sample so that the distribution of our covariates is independent of a partner's departure timing-much like researchers use survey sampling weights to render samples representative of populations of interest (Morgan and Todd 2008) .
To measure departure timing, we used the American Lawyer's Lateral Partner Moves Database and identified the month and year in which each partner gained employment at their first post-Brobeck employer. We coded an indicator variable equal to 1 if the partner departed Brobeck prior to the firm's February 2003 dissolution and equal to 0 otherwise. We then estimated a probit model of prefailure departure by regressing this dichotomous variable on all observed partner covariates. The results of this prefailure departure analysis are summarized in Model 1 of Table 2 . Accounting for all control variables in the specification, the longer a lawyer had been a member of the Brobeck partnership, the less likely he or she was to depart Brobeck prior to failure.
We then created an observation weight for each partner-an inverse Mills ratio-that is equal to the reciprocal of the probit model's predicted likelihood. This weighting approach effectively allows lawyers who were most likely to remain with Brobeck until dissolution to contribute the most to our parameter estimates while retaining the full sample size and its greater variance on the control variables. To be clear, we do not aim to estimate the effects of departure timing (e.g., Semadeni et al. 2008) ; we simply wish to account for the fact that the likelihood of a prefailure departure is negatively correlated with both partnership tenure and the likelihood of status loss.
The prefailure probit model only accounts for the occurrence of the departure event, but partners seeking another job just before dissolution might have had their bargaining power weakened by rumors of Brobeck's troubles. So we also included a measure of the number of months prior to Brobeck's February 2003 dissolution that each partner departed as a safeguard against inadequately accounting for departure timing. For example, partners who transitioned to their first post-Brobeck employer in December 2002 were coded as +2. Partners that transitioned to subsequent employers in February 2003 were coded as 0, and partners who regained employment in April 2003 were coded as −2. In select models, we include this variable as a control variable while retaining the prefailure departure weights. In combination, these two adjustments should alleviate most concerns about the endogenous timing of each partner's departure. The second approach we use to deal with departure timing is testing Hypothesis 1 on the group of more typical partners who remained with the firm until failure. Subsample comparisons reveal only two statistically significant differences between the two groups of partners who left Brobeck before and after the firm's dissolution. The partners who transitioned prior to dissolution had shorter tenures as Brobeck partners (5.9 years versus 9.1 years; p < 0 01) and were less likely to be employed in one of Brobeck's California offices (60% versus 78%; p < 0 01) than partners who remained with Brobeck until dissolution. Important for testing Hypothesis 1, the prefailure and postfailure departure groups are statistically indistinguishable in terms of educational prestige. On average, partners who departed prior to dissolution graduated from the law school ranked 30th and those who departed after dissolution graduated from the 31st-ranked law school (the difference is not statistically significant). Partners in each group are also statistically indistinguishable in prefailure Brobeck income (i.e., our measure of human capital).
Results
Tables 3 and 4 present results of our logit models of intraprofessional status loss. Readers should consider Table 3 as providing preliminary evidence, whereas Lateral Notes. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All observations are clustered by hiring firm. Weighting is by the likelihood of prefailure exit. * * p < 0 01; * p < 0 05; † p < 0 10 (two-tailed tests).
presents the tests of the hypotheses. In particular, we test Hypothesis 1 conditional on a partner remaining with the firm until failure. Model 1 of Table 3 indicates that more senior partners at Brobeck were less likely to regain employment at a lower-status employer. We attribute this hierarchical effect to the fact that the highest revenue producers occupied the highest levels of the Brobeck partnership, making them attractive candidates to potential employers. Although the income residual also indicates that the more productive Brobeck partners (i.e., those with greater operating income) were less likely to regain employment at a lower-status employer, Downloaded from informs.org by [170.140.26 .180] on 29 May 2015, at 07:10 . For personal use only, all rights reserved. this effect is not statistically significant. The coefficient on the constant term indicates that male partners based outside of California who were not part of the business and technology practice and who were recently promoted to partner from within Brobeck were more likely to experience status loss as a result of Brobeck's failure (p < 0 01).
Model 2 of Table 3 demonstrates that partners that exited Brobeck prior to the February 2003 dissolution were less likely to experience status loss than those who remained until after dissolution. But the coefficient on the prefailure exit variable is not statistically significant. Because the decision to exit prior to dissolution is not exogenous, we probe this effect more rigorously. In Model 3, we weight all observations by the inverse Mills of the predicted likelihood of predissolution exit to place greater analytical weight on those partners who were least likely to exit Brobeck prior to dissolution. The key control variables exhibit similar effects when we weight all observations as in our analyses of unweighted observations (Model 2). In Model 4, we instead use a continuous measure of prefailure exit as a control variable in our model. Consistent with prior work (Semadeni et al. 2008) , the further in advance of Brobeck's dissolution that a partner departed, the less likely that partner was to experience status loss (p < 0 10). These results are consistent with our argument that bargaining power decreased continuously until failure. Again, we aim to account for departure timing because it is negatively correlated with both partnership tenure and status loss, but we do not hypothesize about timing effects.
In Model 5, we include our measure of how strongly each partner was associated with Brobeck's failure: years of employment as a Brobeck partner. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, the longer a lawyer was a member of the Brobeck partnership prior to failure, the more likely he or she was to lose intraprofessional status. This effect is only marginally significant (p < 0 10), but the coefficient estimate is net of the fact that the longest-tenured Brobeck partners were least likely to depart prior to firm dissolution, which is accounted for with the inverse Mills weights, and most likely possessed the most firmspecific human capital, which is accounted for with the income residual variable.
In Model 6, we include the numeric U.S. News rank of each partner's law school and find a significant negative relationship with the likelihood of regaining employment at a lower status employer. Again, more prestigious schools are assigned lower numeric ranks. The less prestigious a lawyer's law school (e.g., rank of 100 versus 15), the more likely the lawyer experienced status loss following Brobeck's failure (p < 0 01). This result is consistent with Hypothesis 2. Because some prior research indicates that educational prestige may be better measured categorically than continuously because of distinctions among highly prestigious institutions and other institutions (e.g., Zuckerman 2001, Rivera 2011) , in Model 7 we include the elite law school graduate indicator variable. Indeed, this dichotomous variable exerts stronger effects on the outcome than the continuous variable does. Also consistent with Hypothesis 2, graduates of the 10 most prestigious law schools were significantly less likely to experience status mobility than graduates of other law schools (p < 0 01). Because the specification accounts for variance in productivity by including the income residual, we interpret the effect of educational prestige as a status characteristic effect and not a human capital effect.
In Model 8 we examine our key effects simultaneously with a model that includes both our measure of a partner's association with Brobeck and our dichotomous measure of educational prestige; we find weak support for Hypothesis 1 (p < 0 10) and strong support for Hypothesis 2 (p < 0 01). The stronger the association between a partner and Brobeck's failure, as measured by years spent as a partner, the more likely a partner was to lose intraprofessional status. Moreover, graduates of the most prestigious law schools were least likely to lose status following Brobeck's failure.
Our weighting technique might not adequately account for unobserved differences between partners who departed prior to dissolution and those who remained until dissolution. As we mentioned previously, we consider the strongest test of Hypothesis 1 to be restricted to those partners who remained with the firm until failure because a partner can only be associated with failure after failure occurs. Therefore, we split our sample into these two groups and report the results of subsample analyses in Models 9 and 10 of Table 4 . These analyses indicate that our arguments are primarily supported by the partners who transitioned to their subsequent employer after, not before, Brobeck's dissolution. The results are consistent with both Hypotheses 1 and 2. The effect of partnership tenure is not significant in the prefailure exit subsample but is significantly negative in the postfailure exit subsample (p < 0 01). Moreover, the effect of educational prestige on labor market outcomes is statistically significant only after failure, as evidenced by the nonsignificant coefficient on the elite law school indicator variable in Model 9 and significant coefficient in Model 10 (p < 0 01).
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In Model 11 we find evidence of a nonlinear effect of partnership tenure on the likelihood of status loss. This model demonstrates that the main effect of tenure is largely attributable to high-status loss likelihoods for Brobeck's most tenured partners, all else equal. To put this nonlinear effect in context, a lawyer with partnership tenure of one year was approximately 2.8% more likely to experience status loss than a partner with mean tenure (9.1 years) who remained until dissolution. Relative to that mean-tenured partner, a lawyer with 25 years of tenure (the mean plus two standard deviations) was approximately 20% more likely to experience status loss. This nonlinear effect is consistent with the arguments that motivate Hypothesis 1, but note that, to preserve degrees of freedom and statistical power, we do not maintain this nonmonotonic specification in subsequent models that include full sets of office and practice area indicator variables in the specification. Readers should bear in mind that tenure's main effect is largely driven by Brobeck's most tenured partners and that fact is consistent with the argument that motivates Hypothesis 1.
We again analyze the full sample to estimate effects of office location and legal practice area and the sensitivity of our key results to accounting for these effects. The full sample of 224 partners (versus 161 partners in the postfailure subsample) affords us much greater statistical power.
The California office and business and technology indicator variables crudely differentiate specific labor market demand for lawyers' legal skills. It is also possible that our measures of association with failure and educational prestige merely proxy for other aspects of a lawyer's job prospects-namely, geographic location and area of legal practice. For example, the observed variance in labor market outcomes might be primarily attributable to regional labor market conditions and/or prestige accorded to different areas of legal practice (Sandefur 2001) . We therefore evaluate coefficient estimates for specifications that do and do not include extensive office and practice area fixed effects to gauge the extent to which systematic sorting of partners into offices or practices by educational prestige or partner cohorts might explain our key results.
In Models 12 and 13 of Table 4 , we include the full set of office and practice fixed effects, respectively, and continue to find support for Hypothesis 2 (p < 0 05), but support for Hypothesis 1 is sensitive to the inclusion of practice fixed effects. In Model 14 we simultaneously account for variance across geography and practices and find additional support for both hypotheses, although the coefficient on the partner tenure variable is only marginally significant (p < 0 10). The magnitudes of the coefficient estimates are not statistically different from those in Model 8, indicating that our results are fairly robust to accounting more fully for both location and practice. The key difference between Models 13 and 14 is that support for Hypothesis 1 is contingent upon accounting for heterogeneity across offices when accounting for practice-level heterogeneity.
We calculated changes in the likelihood that a former Brobeck partner experienced status loss based on the coefficients in Model 14. For a male business and technology partner in Brobeck's San Francisco office who was promoted to partner from within the firm and who has mean values on all other continuous covariates, holding a law degree from 1 of the 10 elite law schools we identified reduces the predicted likelihood of experiencing status loss by 13.4%. We infer that educational prestige buffers professionals against failurerelated reductions in labor market bargaining power.
Our results also indicate that the predicted likelihood of regaining employment at a lower-status employer is approximately 15.8% lower for a lawyer who was a Brobeck partner for 1 year than for a lawyer who spent 15 years in the Brobeck partnership (approximately the difference between ±1 standard deviation from the mean tenure of 8.2 years). Thus, the likelihood of losing intraprofessional status as a result of organizational failure increases with the strength of one's association with failure and decreases with one's educational prestige. From these calculations, one can infer that a decade of experience after being promoted to partner is necessary for a graduate of a nonelite law school to be a comparable labor market candidate to an elite school graduate.
Last, our dependent variable is categorical, and a firm's numeric rank in the Vault 100 can change year to year. Also, firms only a few ranks apart may reasonably be considered to be of similar intraprofessional status. Therefore, we gauged the sensitivity of our results to an alternative coding scheme in which we recategorized 23 Brobeck partners that regained employment at lower-status firms as not experiencing status loss if their subsequent employers were within 10 ranks of Brobeck in 2002. Model 15 displays these results. Although the overall model fit is not as strong as prior models, as evidenced by the Wald and R 2 statistics, the coefficients on both independent variables of interest are statistically significant. These results should assuage concerns about the dichotomous nature of our dependent variable as well as the marginal significance of the tenure variable in some specifications.
Discussion
Much scholarly discourse on organizational failure addresses behavioral antecedents (e.g., Moore et al. 2006) and corporate governance implications (e.g., Holmström and Kaplan 2003) . Often overlooked are failure's consequences for employees. Brobeck's failure displaced partners into labor markets where preservation of intraprofessional status depended on organizational employment opportunities. We found important variation in postfailure labor market outcomes: organizational failure was most likely to have adverse career consequences for individuals more strongly associated with the failed organization and for those who lacked educational prestige to "counterbalance" association with failure.
These findings directly address the question of which employees are most adversely affected by failure while also extending two key strands of organizational theory. First, the bargaining power argument connects the Downloaded from informs.org by [170.140.26 .180] on 29 May 2015, at 07:10 . For personal use only, all rights reserved. allocation of status rewards to an organization's competitive strength and supports this argument with analyses across organizations (Phillips 2001, Phillips and Sørensen 2003) . We extend this argument by applying the theory more broadly to the labor market, offering predictions at the interorganizational level of analysis and supporting this theoretical extension by conducting a within-organization analysis of failure. Second, the labor market version of the candidate-audience interface model (Zuckerman et al. 2003 ) accounts for variance in labor market prospects based on the consistency of an individual's prior experiences. We extend this model by offering an account of how audiences reconcile inconsistent information about a candidate's prior experiences to form aggregate evaluations.
Our study also offers insights into the study of cumulative career advantage, the scholarly examination of how initially small advantages of individuals and groups produce increasing disparities over time. Some professionals demonstrate excellence early in their careers, gain access to resources such as visibility, and receive recognition that enables them to exceed role performance standards and to then attract greater resources, visibility, and recognition (Merton 1968) . Although such processes can account for increasing intraprofessional inequality, consideration of countervailing processes that might stop, slow, or reverse accumulation has been restricted largely to theoretical speculation (Zuckerman 1998) . To our knowledge, this study is the first to examine empirically how a negative trigger event (i.e., organizational failure) can diminish one's cumulative career advantage.
We also found evidence that one of the factors thought to initiate advantage accumulation, educational prestige, protects individuals' accumulated career advantages. We argued that because of bargaining power and status organizing processes, the hiring decisions of high-status law firms favor graduates of prestigious law schools. Even when accounting for productivity (i.e., prefailure income), the greater the prestige of one's law school, the better one's postfailure labor market outcome (the bivariate correlation between law school prestige and compensation at Brobeck is 0.008). Given that each of these lawyers won a "promotion-to-partner" tournament (Galanter and Palay 1991) after nearly a decade of meeting the expectations incumbent of a partner at a high-status law firm (e.g., generating business, managing client relationships, producing profits), the enduring effect of educational prestige is somewhat surprising and warrants further examination.
Educational prestige might play a lasting role in hiring outcomes because diffuse status characteristics dominate specific status characteristics. Reformulating status characteristics theory, Simpson and Walker (2002) suggest that diffuse status characteristics shape general performance expectations and, consequently, exert greater influence than specific status characteristics, which only influence task-specific performance expectations. Alternatively, educational prestige might signal some intrinsic, time-invariant quality of individuals (Spence 1973) , or "purity of character," which later counterbalances a negative characteristic that calls one into question (Pontikes et al. 2010) .
Another possibility is that educational prestige provides social justification in business decisions. For example, although lawyers can demonstrate their productivity to potential employers by presenting a strong "book of business," clients might prioritize less specific indicators of ability and character-for example, educational prestige. Employers might value prestige more for its symbolism in product and factor markets and less for its signal of ability. In this way, educational prestige helps individuals effectively adjust to a loss of resources, a process labeled "cooling out" by Goffman (1952) , in order to maintain intraprofessional status.
Despite our research design's inferential advantages, the setting has important limitations. First, the effects of more or less controversial failures might be different from those we identified.
Second, there is an inherent trade-off between obtaining a large sample of individuals affected by organizational failure and obtaining a sample of individuals reasonably culpable for failure. Often, only top executives are blamed for organizational shortcomings (e.g., Boeker 1992) . If the rank and file are not substantially affected by failure, then sampling all organizational employees might be an inappropriate empirical strategy. Yet sampling only top executives from many failures necessitates accounting for variation in causes and severity across many failures. Future research could fruitfully extend our work by investigating failure's effects on many employees displaced by failure and, drawing on Gibbons and Katz's (1991) asymmetric information model of "layoffs and lemons," by comparing labor market outcomes of individuals displaced by dissolutions versus those selected for layoffs. Our arguments imply that the negative ability signal of selective dismissal will be attenuated by educational prestige, but the association effects are less clear.
Third, we can isolate the cause of interorganizational mobility, but we can only do so for one organization that employs high-status professionals of many cohorts drawn from many law schools. Future research that examines the effects of countervailing processes such as failure on employees of multiple organizations and/or many cohort members would further inform our understanding of cumulative advantage. It is likely that in many settings individuals associated with failure are forced to trade off pecuniary and nonpecuniary employment terms (e.g., Phillips 2001) . Unfortunately, we cannot observe wages in our setting, and most Brobeck partners retained the title of "partner" (or its equivalent) at Downloaded from informs.org by [170.140.26 .180] on 29 May 2015, at 07:10 . For personal use only, all rights reserved. subsequent employers. Yet recent research indicates that law firm partners do encounter trade-offs between pecuniary and nonpecuniary benefits when changing employers (Rider and Tan 2015) .
Fourth, it is difficult to unequivocally isolate causal mechanisms in our study. With confidence, we infer only that failure can diminish one's accumulated career advantage and that one's chances of intraprofessional status loss vary with educational prestige and with association with failure. Fifth, at the industry level, law school graduates may sort into specific practice areas or geographic locations on the basis of educational prestige. Although our analysis accounts for these differences with fixed effects, our data are also limited to one firm with several practice areas. Future research might examine variation in prestige's buffering capacity across geographies and practice areas for a larger sample of lawyers who are representative of the industry's educational prestige distribution.
Last, future studies might examine the labor market's demand side in greater detail than ours. For example, one might draw on theories of status anxiety (Jensen 2006) and employer characteristics to answer the question, "Which organizations hire employees of failed organizations?" Another promising inquiry would be to evaluate the permanency of failure-related discredit. Once "tainted" by failure and relegated to lower status, do individuals' careers recover? If so, then how long does recovery take? Are the consequences of failure worse than, say, graduating in a recession (Kahn 2010) ?
Conclusion
Brobeck's unexpected dissolution enables us to examine variation in displaced employees' experienced consequences of organizational failure. Recent quasiexperimental studies demonstrate how similarly negative conditions influence individuals' careers. For example, Oyer (2006 Oyer ( , 2008 leverages random variation in macroeconomic conditions to account for the effects of initial placement on the career attainment of economists and MBA graduates. Another study finds that actors who worked with artists later blacklisted as communists experienced higher risks of unemployment after Hollywood's "Red Scare," ostensibly as a result of "stigma by association" (Pontikes et al. 2010) . Future research that leverages such designs would contribute valuable insights into organizational theory and, more generally, our understanding of intraprofessional status attainment (Merton 1968 , Zuckerman 1998 , Bothner et al. 2010 ).
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